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DAMPENING FINANCIAL REGULATORY CYCLES
Brett McDonnell*
Abstract
Financial regulation should be countercyclical, strengthening during
speculative booms to contain excessive leverage and loosening
following crises so as to not limit credit extension in hard times. And
yet, financial regulation in fact tends to be procyclical, strengthening
following crises and loosening during booms. This Article considers
competing descriptive and normative analyses of that procyclical
tendency. All of the models and arguments considered are rooted in a
public choice perspective on financial regulation, i.e., rational choice
ideas drawn from economics and applied to politics, but with that
perspective modified to take account of behavioralist biases in
rationality, particularly the availability bias. That bias helps explain the
procyclical tendency in financial regulation, as both the public and
regulators ignore the threat of financial crises during boom times and
become very focused on that threat when crises actually occur. The
normal dominance of concentrated interest groups temporarily shifts as
public attention turns to financial regulation following a crisis.
The models considered here differ greatly in their normative
conclusions; some mainly criticize the deregulation that occurs during
booms, some mainly criticize the regulation that occurs following
crises, and some criticize the timing of both. The models differ in how
they understand the balance of interest groups outside of crises and how
likely that balance is to lead to outcomes that reflect the public interest;
in how well they think the crisis-related public attention can be
channeled to reflect the public interest; and in how they analyze the
underlying vulnerability of financial institutions and markets and the
intellectual difficulty of regulation. After analyzing these differing
models, this Article considers historical evidence to determine the best
approach, and then considers various administrative mechanisms that
might help dampen the procyclical tendencies of financial regulation.
This Article considers procedures such as bicameralism and the
committee system in Congress, notice-and-comment rulemaking, hardlook judicial review, independent agencies, sunset clauses, mandated
agency studies, regulatory “contrarians,” and automatic triggers for
* For helpful comments, I thank Victor Fleischer, Jose Gabilondo, Erik Gerding,
Harvey Goldschmid, Zachary Gubler, Claire Hill, Howell Jackson, Daniel Pi, Paul Rubin,
Andrew Shwartz, Dan Schwarcz, Danny Sokol, and participants in the Canadian Law and
Economics Association and Midwestern Law and Economics Association annual conferences,
the conference on the Political Economy of Financial Regulation at George Washington
University Law School, and seminars at the University of Colorado, Florida State, and
University of Minnesota Law Schools.
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INTRODUCTION
Financial markets tend to experience cycles. After periods of relative
calm and good news, one sees speculative bubbles. Investors crowd into
favored markets and assets, often financing their investments with everincreasing levels of debt. The bubbles eventually burst, and that debt
helps lead to contagious panics. These crises frequently bring entire
economies into recession, and those recessions are often painful and
long lasting, as institutions try to dig out from under their debts.1
Governments’ responses to these cycles also tend to follow a pattern,
but the pattern is not ideal. Insofar as governments regulate financial
markets and institutions to reduce speculative bubbles and avoid crises,
such regulation should kick in or become stronger during the boom
times, when restraint on markets is (arguably) needed. Strengthened
regulation during and immediately following financial crises, in
contrast, risks further reducing credit precisely when credit has
collapsed and needs to expand to help finance recovery. In short,
optimal financial regulation should be countercyclical.2
1. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES:
A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 9–10 (5th ed. 2005); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S.
ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 224 (2009).
2. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
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Alas, in practice, regulation appears to be procyclical.3 That is, major
new regulatory initiatives, both statutory and administrative, happen
most frequently during or immediately following financial crises. The
leading, prototypical examples are the extensive financial regulatory
statutes enacted during the New Deal.4 In contrast, during boom times
there appears to be a tendency for politicians, judges, and regulators to
share the optimism that helps fuel the booms, with the result that they
tend to deregulate precisely when regulation should strengthen.5 The
gradual loosening and then elimination of the separation of commercial
and investment banking is an important example.6
What causes financial regulation to be procyclical, and is there
anything we can do to reverse, or at least reduce, the trend? This Article
addresses these questions. A number of scholars have noticed this
problem, and this Article discusses some of them. Review of their work,
though, shows a split in how scholars evaluate the procyclical regulation
problem. Some think the main concern is governments’ tendency to
overregulate following crises; these scholars see deregulation in good
times as a useful corrective.7 Others think the main concern involves
deregulation in good times and see crises as the only time that needed
regulation is politically feasible.8 Still others think we get things quite
wrong in both phases.9 Which diagnosis one believes greatly affects
which prescriptions look most attractive.
Part I describes the basic character of financial markets and
regulatory cycles. Part II analyzes some of the leading scholarly
narratives addressing procyclical regulation and categorizes these
narratives into three models. Model 1 sees overregulation following
crises and excessive deregulation in boom periods. However, compared
to the other two models it does see a bright side; it describes the average
level of regulation over time as roughly correct, even if its cyclical
variations are out of optimal phase. Model 2 is more concerned with
overregulation following crises, which it believes leads to a long-run
pattern of overregulation. Model 3 is more concerned with excessive
deregulation occurring in boom times, believing that this helps lead to a
long-run pattern of overly weak regulation.
3. See infra Section I.B (discussing how new financial regulations are typically not
enacted until after the passage of a financial crisis). This Article uses the term “procyclical” as a
contrast to “countercyclical,” and uses the latter term in the conventional way to refer to policy
that acts to counteract financial cycles.
4. See infra 110–16 and accompanying text.
5. ERIK GERDING, BUBBLES, FINANCIAL REGULATION, AND LAW 11 (forthcoming 2013).
6. E.g., Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
7. See infra Section II.B.
8. See infra Section II.C.
9. See infra Section II.A.
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All models considered here are rooted in a classical public choice
analysis10 in which more concentrated interest groups (as opposed to
diffuse groups) are more capable of organizing to promote their
preferred policies. The models are compared on three dimensions: the
regulatory demand side, the regulatory supply side, and normative
foundations.
The “regulatory demand side” refers to how the models understand
the usual organizational success of differing interest groups focused on
financial regulation. The models differ somewhat in their analyses of
competing groups. Models 1 and 3 see most financial regulation as
characterized by one-sided organization, with financial insiders well
organized and consumer groups and the general public poorly
organized. Model 2, on the other hand, sees more divergence among
organized interests within financial markets, and hence more balanced
political competition. All of the models see a fundamental change
occurring during financial crises, as the general public and ordinary
politicians suddenly focus on financial regulation, which they usually
ignore. However, Models 1 and 2 see this as leading to impulsive,
uninformed, and overly restrictive (or else empty) new rules, while
Model 3 thinks there are actors who can help guide the new rules in a
more positive way (although their efforts sometimes meet only limited
success).
The “regulatory supply side” refers to how regulators and politicians
respond to interest group pressures. All three models see both legislators
and regulators as heavily influenced by the best organized group, but
wanting to at least appear responsive to the general public when public
attention focuses on financial regulation. Model 2 adds emphasis on the
tendency for bureaucrats to favor rules that extend the power of their
agencies.
The third dimension of comparison is “normative foundations,”
which refers to concepts of how well lightly regulated financial markets
and institutions are likely to function and how intellectually demanding
effective financial regulation will likely be. Model 2 sees markets as
functioning relatively well and regulation as extremely challenging
conceptually, while Model 3 is more distrustful of markets and less
distrustful of regulation.
10. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 1 (1991) (providing an overview of public choice theory); DENNIS C.
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III, at 1–2, 6 (2003) (surveying the field of public choice theory and
its impact on positive and normative understandings of politics); MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD
J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 1–2, 45–46 (2009) (contrasting
public interest, pluralism, and modern public choice models); D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the
Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109 MICH. L. REV 1029, 1029–30 (2011) (reviewing
PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW, a casebook devoted to public choice in
legal settings).
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Table 1 summarizes the three models:
Model 1
Both
overregulation
after crisis and
excessive deregulation in
boom
Roughly right
level of
regulation
Industry groups
favor weak
regulation in
boom; populist
pressure for
strong
regulation after
crisis

Model 2
Overregulation
after crisis

Model 3
Excessive deregulation in
boom

Overly strong
regulation

Overly weak
regulation

Balanced interest
groups in boom;
ignorant populist
pressure after
crisis

Regulatory
supply side

Interest group
capture

Normative
foundations

Lightly
regulated
markets are
unstable but
regulation is
hard

Interest group
capture and
bureaucratic
aggrandizement
Lightly regulated
markets work
well, regulation is
very hard

Industry
groups favor
weak
regulation in
boom; populist
pressure
reflects public
interest after
crisis
Interest group
capture

Period of
cycle of most
concern

Long term
trend
Regulatory
demand side

Lightly
regulated
markets are
deeply
unstable,
regulation isn’t
all that hard

Table 1
Part III briefly surveys the historical experience with financial
regulation in the United States, in order to sort out which of the three
models best describes that experience. All models suggest some real
insights, and can point to historical examples and data that support
them. But all in all, this Article argues that Model 1 best explains the
central tendencies of the American historical experience. Moreover,
although Model 1 sees significant dysfunction in the timing of
regulatory innovation, in comparison with the other two models there is
a silver lining. At least the long-term level of regulation is more or less
optimal, not too long or short of the mark. Over time we have created a
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system for regulating financial institutions and markets that, on balance,
seems better than the much more laissez-faire approach of the
nineteenth century. We have achieved greater stability without much
less efficiency and innovation. The core of that regulatory system was
instituted following financial crises, above all in the New Deal.
Strengthening the rules in boom times and loosening them following a
crisis would be better, yes, but doing so mostly exceeds our political
and cognitive capacities.
Part IV nonetheless tries to learn from the models and the historical
evidence to consider ways to smooth out the financial regulatory cycle,
and encourage sensible new rules while weeding out overregulation.
Which procedures look best will depend of course on which model one
thinks best fits our experience—Model 2 will tend to encourage
procedures that limit new rules and help undo past mistaken rules, while
Model 3 will try to stop existing rules from being undone. Many
existing elements of administrative procedure already help achieve
some of these goals, and there are a variety of proposals for other
procedures that might further help. Some of the procedures this Article
considers include bicameralism and the committee system in Congress,
notice-and-comment
rulemaking,
hard-look
judicial
review,
independent agencies, sunset clauses, mandated agency studies,
regulatory “contrarians,” and automatic triggers for various rules.
I. THE BASIC CHARACTER OF FINANCIAL MARKET AND REGULATORY
CYCLES
A basic premise of this Article is that financial market cycles and
financial regulatory cycles are closely tied to each other. Similar
psychological factors help drive each, and each helps cause the other.11
This Part quickly sketches some of the basic characteristics and causes
of each kind of cycle, starting with financial market cycles. Later parts
will both build and elaborate upon these characteristics and causes.
A. Financial Market Cycles
This Article’s account of financial market cycles follows that of
Hyman Minsky.12 Financial bubbles begin after a period of economic
11. GERDING, supra note 5.
12. Compare HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY 197–220 (1st ed.
1986), with José Gabilondo, Dodd-Frank, Liability Structure, and Financial Instability Cycles:
Neither a (Ponzi) Borrower nor a Lender Be, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 469, 469–70 (2011),
Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions During and After a Financial
Crisis, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 27 (2011) [hereinafter McDonnell, Don’t Panic!], and Brett H.
McDonnell, Of Mises and Min(sky): Libertarian and Liberal Responses to Financial Crises
Past and Present, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1279, 1301–02 (2011) [hereinafter McDonnell, Of
Mises and Min(sky)].
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quiet has caused investors and businesses to forget the pain and lessons
of the last bust. Some new developments spur new investments.
Optimism grows and starts feeding on itself as more new investors get
into the game, inflating asset prices and helping assure good returns for
the early investors. Investors take on increasing amounts of debt; a great
way to multiply profit so long as things go well, but a source of serious
risk if things go badly and they are unable to pay off the debt.13 Debt
grows, and the whole system becomes increasingly unstable as the
boom enters its final period of frenzy. Eventually expectations shift—
even very small pieces of bad news can set off the end of the bubble and
the beginning of the bust. With debt so high, once expectations start
turning, investors start trying to get out of their investments to pay off
their debt. But as growing numbers try to sell off, asset prices start to
plummet. A vicious cycle of falling prices and bankruptcies leads to a
crash.14 The financial crisis feeds into the real economy as businesses
are unable to fund operations. A major contraction follows. It typically
takes years to recover, as financial companies and businesses hoard cash
and try to rebuild their shattered financial status.15
As mentioned, Minsky was the key innovator in developing an
economic model of financial market booms and busts. Minsky, in turn,
built on the work of Keynes.16 But these ideas are not limited to liberal
Keynesians—a somewhat similar story can be found in Mises and
Hayek’s Austrian business cycle theory.17 Minsky’s theory underlies
Charles Kindleberger’s pathbreaking work on the history of manias and
panics.18 It also fits well with the more recent and systematic history of
13. See MINSKY, supra note 12, at 211–14.
14. See MINSKY, supra note 12, at 214–17; see also KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note
1, at 9–11.
15. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 9−11; Irving Fisher, The DebtDeflation Theory of Great Depressions, 1 ECONOMETRICA 337, 342 (1933); see also MINSKY,
supra note 12, at 219–20.
16. Compare JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
INTEREST, AND MONEY 46–47 (1936) (describing the dependence of producers’ business
decisions on their expectations of consumer demand), with HYMAN P. MINSKY, JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES (1976), and MINSKY, supra note 12, at 172 (“The fundamentals of a theory of financial
instability can be derived from Keynes’s General Theory . . . .”).
17. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, PRICES AND PRODUCTION 75−101 (2d ed. 1935) (“[I]ndustrial
fluctuations consist essentially in alternating expansions and contractions of the structure of
capital equipment . . . .”); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 4 (1960); F.A. Hayek,
The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526–27 (1940) [hereinafter Hayek,
The Use of Knowledge in Society] (discussing how individuals with limited knowledge can
communicate relevant information in the marketplace via prices); McDonnell, Of Mises and
Min(sky), supra note 12, at 1288–89 (noting the similarities between the Austrian and
Keynesian theories); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Commentary, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV.
77, 79−83 (2003) (describing the “boom-bubble-bust-regulate” cycle of financial regulation).
18. KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 21−32.
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crises by Reinhardt and Rogoff.19
Recent work on behavioral economics20 and behavioral finance21
reinforces Minsky’s story. People vary systematically from the sort of
rational behavior usually assumed by economists in a variety of ways.
Perhaps most central to our story is the availability bias—people give
too much emphasis to recent and salient events.22 Thus, as the boom
develops, market participants forget busts in the past, and are beguiled
by recent good market news. Also important are rational herding23 and
the social nature of expectations.24 People tend to follow the beliefs of
others around them, making both bubbles and busts self-reinforcing.
One important objection to behavioral finance is that even if many
people suffer from such deviations from rationality, with so much
money at stake, markets should correct mistakes, as more rational
investors find ways to benefit from the mistakes of others.25 But as
economic theorists and empirical researchers have developed behavioral
finance, they have put forward a number of reasons why such market
corrections may frequently be weak and delayed.26
Of course, not everyone buys into the Minsky-style story of financial
market instability. Believers in the efficient capital market hypothesis
typically maintain that financial markets are better behaved than Minsky
would suggest, although even within an efficient markets approach,
some significant instability is possible.27 Given the extensive history of
unstable markets, this view seems hard to maintain.28 At any rate, this
19. REINHARDT & ROGOFF, supra note 1 (providing a quantitative analysis of different
types of financial crises throughout history).
20. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–77 (1998); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124–30
(1974).
21. See ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE 113−14, 154−55 (2000).
22. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208–09 (1973) (proposing and
analyzing the availability heuristic).
23. See Andrea Devenow & Ivo Welch, Rational Herding in Financial Economics, 40
EUR. ECON. REV. 603, 603–05 (1996) (noting the significance of herding in the financial realm).
24. See Claire A. Hill, Justification Norms Under Uncertainty: A Preliminary Inquiry, 17
CONN. INS. L.J. 27, 28–29, 34–35 (2010) (identifying herding and social norms as influential on
decision making).
25. See SHLEIFER, supra note 21, at 2–5.
26. Id. at 23–27.
27. See Karl Shell, Sunspot Equilibrium, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume, eds., 2d ed. 2008), available at
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_S000325 (subscription required)
(describing different extrinsic sources of market volatility in economic outcomes).
28. KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1, at 21−32; REINHARDT & ROGOFF, supra note
1 (providing an empirical analysis of the boom–bust cycle of financial crises using data from

2013]

DAMPENING FINANCIAL REGULATORY CYCLES

1605

Article will not relitigate that dispute. This Article will assume a
Minskyan understanding of financial markets.
Given this understanding, there is clearly conceptual room for
welfare-improving financial regulation. One would want that regulation
be countercyclical. That is, regulation should become more strict during
boom times, working to lean against the wind of euphoria and to help
keep bubbles from inflating as far and as fast as they would in the
absence of regulation. When busts hit, the regulation should lighten up,
so that it does less to inhibit financial companies from extending credit
during a time when credit is tight anyway.29
B. Financial Regulatory Cycles
And yet, that is not what we typically observe. Major new financial
rules, both legislation and agency regulations, tend to occur in the wake
of financial crises. The most dramatic example in American history is
the New Deal financial regulation.30 In the last decade we have seen the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act following the dot-com bust,31 and then the DoddFrank Act following the financial crisis of 2007–2008.32
These are not isolated examples. Stuart Banner has studied the
history of securities regulation over the last several hundred years.33 In
an article summarizing some of that research, Banner writes that “[i]f
new technology doesn’t cause new securities regulation, what does? In a
nutshell, crashes.”34 Of course, as Banner notes, this is not a universal
rule, but it is a strong one:
This is just a general trend, not an absolute rule. There have
been sharp price declines without subsequent regulation,
and of course there has been regulation without immediately
sixty-six countries over eight centuries).
29. See Amitai Aviram, Countercyclical Enforcement of Corporate Law, 25 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 8–9 (2008) (noting that the availability bias justifies enforcement of corporate fraud in
economic upturns and limited enforcement in downturns); Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K Kashyap,
& Jeremy C. Stein, A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J. ECON. PERSPS.
3, 5–8, 17 (2011) (”We have argued . . . imposing substantially higher capital requirements on
financial firms, particularly in good times.”); Michal Kowalik, Countercyclical Capital
Regulation: Should Bank Regulators Use Rules or Discretion?, FED. RES. BANK KAN. CITY
ECON. REV., no. 2, 2011, at 63, 66–69 (2011) (arguing in favor of “countercyclical capital
requirements”).
30. See infra notes 110–16 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 158–64 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 128–33 and accompanying text.
33. See generally STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION:
CULTURAL AND POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690–1860 (1998) (analyzing regulation of securities markets
from 1690 England to 1860 United States).
34. Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75
WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997).
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preceding price declines. But most of the major instances of
new securities regulation in the past three hundred years of
English and American history have come right after
crashes.35
Banking regulation also shows a marked tendency for innovation and
strengthening in response to crises.36
Meanwhile, in boom times there is some tendency for a loosening of
financial regulation. Regulators fail to respond to new market
developments and risks. A good example is the opposition to the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s proposal to regulate
derivatives in the 1990s. Agencies become less vigorous in enforcing
existing rules by interpreting rules in ways that lessen their bite. The
gradual erosion of the Glass-Steagall separation of commercial and
investment banking is a leading example. Sometimes, regulators may
amend or repeal regulations or legislation completely, as eventually
happened to Glass-Steagall in 1999. Governments may affirmatively
subsidize financial frenzies in a variety of ways.37
As the next Part explains, scholars differ in how they describe the
pattern and its causes, and in the normative consequences they draw.
II. COMPETING MODELS OF REGULATORY CYCLES
Many scholars have noted the procyclical tendency of financial
regulation. They have analyzed both its causes and the normative
consequences. There is some significant overlap in these analyses.
Some of the judgment heuristics and biases that cause market cycles
also help explain the regulatory cycle.38 Most importantly, the
availability bias has a particularly strong effect on the general public
and the media.39 Most of the time, financial regulation is not a subject
that interests the average citizen. But during a financial crisis, this
changes. Frauds committed during the boom typically come to light
during the bust, many people feel deep pain due to the crisis, and
35. Id.
36. See JILL M. HENDRICKSON, REGULATION AND INSTABILITY IN U.S. COMMERCIAL
BANKING: A HISTORY OF CRISES 14 (2011).
37. See GERDING, supra note 5, for numerous examples of all of these.
38. E.g., HENDRICKSON, supra note 36; Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral
Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5, 44–45 (2003); David Hirshleifer, Psychological
Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation, 14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 856, 865–67 (2008); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 549, 553–55 (2002).
39. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 22; Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein,
Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 711–15, 735–36 (1999)
(discussing the relationship between the availability heuristic, government regulation, and media
attention).
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ordinary people expect politicians to react. Politicians are quite aware of
this pressure to act.40 Even more informed actors within the financial
industry and financial regulatory agencies are affected by the
availability bias (indeed, its effect on industry participants is a leading
source of the underlying financial cycle), and their own assessments of
the need for a regulation shift.41 Thus, during and for a while after a
financial crisis, there is both significant political pressure to act to
prevent future crises and some willingness on the part of industry
insiders to allow regulation. This pressure following crises is hardly
unique to financial regulation, but as this Article argues below, the
linkages between regulation and the phenomenon being regulated are
tighter here than for other forms of regulation.42
These factors reverse themselves during a boom period. The general
public and most politicians pay little attention to financial regulation.
Thus, financial market participants’ and regulators’ perceptions and
interests dominate the politics of regulation.43 While things are going
well, everyone is making money, and financial companies appear
healthy, there is little appetite for major new regulation and often quite
significant desire for loosened regulation. New financial products and
markets appear, and regulators do little to address them.
Since financial regulation should optimally be countercyclical, it
should come as no surprise that commentators have found much to
dislike in this procyclical pattern of financial regulation. Regulators
must be getting some things wrong during at least one phase in the
cycle, and quite possibly both.
Despite many similarities, commentators have differed sharply in
their analyses of procyclical financial regulation. This is true even for
those who work within an economic understanding of politics. The
public choice tradition can be seen as considering both the demand for
and supply of regulation. On the demand side are a variety of interest
groups.44 Analysts differ on the incentives and balance of power among
these groups, and how that balance changes over the course of market
and regulatory cycles. On the supply side are politicians and regulators.
Analysts also differ over the incentives they face and how those shift
over the course of a cycle.45 Finally, there is much debate over the
normative conclusions to be drawn from the analysis. Those with a
more pro-market slant are typically more concerned with overregulation
40.
41.
42.
43.
13–14.
44.
45.

See HENDRICKSON, supra note 36, at 13–14; Choi & Pritchard, supra note 38, at 39.
See, e.g., Choi & Pritchard, supra note 38, at 5.
See infra p. 16.
See Choi & Pritchard, supra note 38, at 24–25; cf. HENDRICKSON, supra note 36, at
See infra notes 46–60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 61–67, 71 and accompanying text.
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following a market crisis, while those with a more pro-regulatory slant
are more concerned with loosened regulation during good times.
This Article sorts these differing analyses into three different
models. Model 1 sees regulators overreacting in both phases—during
busts they overregulate; during booms they loosen regulation too much.
Model 2 is more concerned about overregulation in the wake of market
busts. Model 3 is more concerned about excessively loose regulation
during market booms.
These models are stylizations. No one scholar may fit exactly within
any of them. The world is messier than any of the models, and good
scholars recognize that mess, at least in the nooks and crannies of their
analyses. Still, the models help impose some analytical order, and
highlight some of the crucial questions on which scholars differ.
A. Overreaction in Both Phases (Model 1)
In a sense, Model 1, finding overreaction in both phases, is the most
natural framework that emerges once one recognizes the basic
procyclical nature of financial regulation. One can arrive at variants of
Model 1 by recognizing all of the competing political forces analyzed in
Models 2 and 3 and the competing normative elements, and concluding
that they all roughly balance one another, leading to less condemnation
of bust overregulation than Model 2 and less condemnation of boom
underregulation than Model 3. For expository simplicity, though, this
section will focus on the core forces that tend to drive overregulation
following a crisis, leaving Model 3 to describe forces that may
counteract them, and will focus on the core forces that tend to drive
underregulation during a boom, leaving Model 2 to describe forces that
may counteract them.
The basic story of loosened regulation during boom times follows
from Mancur Olson’s theory of interest groups.46 On most political
issues, one should generally expect effective lobbying to be dominated
by relatively small, concentrated interest groups.47 Each member of
these groups has a strong interest in the outcome of regulation, and the
strength of those interests combined with relatively small numbers
allow the members to overcome the “free rider” problem inherent in
lobbying for regulations that will affect all members of the group,
whether they contributed to the lobbying effort or not. In contrast,
consumers and the general public are large and diffuse groups.48 Each
member has relatively small stakes in regulation on a particular topic,
46. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965)
(presenting Olson’s theory of groups and organizations).
47. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 211 (1962).
48. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 10, at 1.
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and although the collective public interest in good regulation may be
quite considerable, free riding prevents effective lobbying from taking
place.49 Heightening the problem, industry insiders will have much
greater expertise than members of the general public, and hence will be
better able to provide useful information to regulators.50 However, the
information they provide is likely slanted.
Olson’s story is not specific to financial regulation, but it certainly
applies.51 During boom times, the general public neither understands
nor cares about financial regulation.52 Financial market insiders do.
Business is going well as is. For the most part, insiders are happy with
things as they are. They do not want burdensome new rules, which may
limit their ability to make money.53 Indeed, they may well want to
reduce the burden of existing rules, which have imposed unwanted
costs. As noted above, there are a variety of ways of doing this. Some
may involve simple regulatory inaction. As markets boom, financial
market participants develop new products and markets not clearly
addressed by existing rules.54 Think, for example, of the development of
credit default swaps, particularly those tied to the growing mortgage
securitization market from the 1980s on. Generally, those market
49. See OLSON, supra note 46, at 14–16; see also BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 47,
at 36–38; George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
3, 13–14 (1971).
50. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019,
1031–32, 1047 (2012).
51. For applications of public choice theory to financial regulation, see HENDRICKSON,
supra note 36, at 13; George J. Benston, Federal Regulation of Banking: Historical Overview,
in DEREGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES: PUBLIC POLICY IN FLUX 1 (George G. Kaufman &
Roger C. Kormendi eds., 1986); Coffee, supra note 50, at 1020–23, 1046–47 (applying to the
Dodd-Frank Act); Franklin R Edwards & James Scott, Regulating Solvency of Depository
Institutions: A Perspective for Deregulation, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 65, 78
(Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on
Demand: A Private Interest Model, with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. &
ECON. 311, 311–12 (1987) (applying to SEC rules); Gregg A. Jarrell, Change at the Exchange:
The Causes and Effects of Deregulation, 27 J.L. & ECON. 273, 284–85 (1984) (applying to the
deregulation of the New York Stock Exchange by way of the Securities Acts Amendments of
1975); Edward J. Kane, Changing Incentives Facing Financial-Services Regulators, 2 J. FIN.
SERVS. RES. 265, 265–66 (1989) (applying generally to decisions by financial services
regulators); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 922 (1994) (applying to
the SEC).
52. See Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1629, 1644–45 (2011).
53. When we discuss Model 2 we will consider some counterarguments, examining some
interested groups that may want to expand regulation even in good times. See infra Section II.B.
54. See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1717 (2010).
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participants will not want to see new rules burdening new products and
markets and will oppose such proposals. Thus, for example, the
securities industry opposed attempts by the Clinton Administration’s
Commodities Futures Trading Commission to regulate credit default
swaps.55 This is the most likely form of effective regulatory loosening.
More affirmative loosening of existing rules may occur through simple
underenforcement.56 As markets become larger and more complex,
regulatory resources may become more stretched.57 Industry interests
will oppose attempts to provide more resources to regulators.58 Market
participants may lobby for liberal agency interpretations of existing
rules, which interpret ambiguities in ways that allow them to do what
they want—the gradual evisceration of Glass-Steagall is a key
instance.59 Going further, they may lobby agencies to amend or repeal
unwanted regulations, or even lobby Congress to amend or repeal
unwanted legislation.60
Olson’s story focuses on the regulatory demand side, namely the
organization of political lobbying. What of the supply side? The most
standard public choice story sees politicians focused on reelection. For a
policy area in which one side of the issue features concentrated interests
and the other side diffuse interests, the way to achieve that is to favor
the side with concentrated interests.61 Those with diffuse interests will
pay little or no attention to the rules, while those with concentrated
interests will provide votes both directly and, more importantly, through
campaign contributions.62 A similar story holds for regulators, where
public choice analysts speak of “regulatory capture.” A variety of
mechanisms cause regulators to favor the industry they are regulating.
Through the revolving door,63 regulators may either themselves come
from the industry or may anticipate getting cushy industry jobs after
they leave government. The industry also provides crucial information
needed for regulating. This is apparent, for instance, in the detailed
comments from banks and their lawyers on the proposed regulation
55. See Coffee, supra note 50, at 1033, 1033–34 n.56.
56. See, e.g., id. at 1027–28.
57. GERDING, supra note 5; Omarova, supra note 54, at 1688–91.
58. Again, we shall consider counterforces under Model 2. See infra Section II.B.
59. See Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the
“Business of Banking,” 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1049–52 (2009).
60. GERDING, supra note 5.
61. See MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF POLITICAL
MARKETS 93–95 (1981).
62. Cf. Coffee, supra note 50, at 1021–22.
63. See MICHAEL SMALLBERG, PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, REVOLVING REGULATORS:
SEC FACES ETHICS CHALLENGES WITH REVOLVING DOOR 4 (2011), available at
http://www.pogo.org/our-work/reports/2011/fo-fra-20110513.html; McDonnell & Schwarcz,
supra note 52, at 1644.
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implementing Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule, as compared with the
emptier although numerous letters from more populist sources.64 Those
in the industry constantly push for changes favoring them, providing
strong expert documentation for their positions, while few have
incentive to argue the public interest, so the regulators get biased
arguments.65 Compounding the tendency for underregulation on both
the demand and supply side, the availability bias and other heuristics
that drive the markets will also affect market participants and regulators
when it comes to thinking about regulation.66 Insofar as financial
regulation is aimed at avoiding crashes, even well-informed insiders
will tend to underestimate the probability of such crashes during a
boom, and hence undervalue the benefits of regulation. Indeed, there are
fewer arbitrage mechanisms to correct such bias in regulation than there
are within markets.67
Things change markedly in the wake of a market crash. Most
importantly, the general public becomes engaged. The risks that flow
from market crashes are suddenly highly salient. There is pressure to
both do something about the current contraction and also avoid future
crashes.68 Crashes will typically reveal a variety of frauds and shady
practices that occurred during, and at least arguably helped heighten, the
market boom.69 The public wants to see something done to reign in the
rich, reckless financial manipulators who have brought the economy
crashing down. Even financial market participants will have become
much more aware of the dangers of lightly regulated financial markets,
and may favor at least some new regulation to avoid a repeat—after all,
market crashes are disastrous for many of them. So for instance,
following the latest crash, the Dodd-Frank Act finally imposed
regulations on derivatives such as credit default swaps by implementing
clearinghouses and similar mechanisms.70
On the regulatory supply side, politicians and regulators will become
more aware of the risks of loosely regulated financial markets. For
64. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer”: The Sausage-Making of
Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 58–59, 84 (2013).
65. See id. at 80.
66. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 39, at 710 (“[V]arious characteristics of risks affect
lay judgments about whether they call for public regulation.”).
67. Although, there may be some mechanisms for a political analog to arbitrage. See
Aviram, supra note 29, at 17–18.
68. See HENDRICKSON, supra note 36; Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the
Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L. REV. 745, 779 (2013); Hirshleifer, supra note 38, at 861,
865.
69. See Aviram, supra note 29, at 8.
70. See Coffee, supra note 50, at 1047, 1062–63. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 721–54, 124 Stat. 1376, 1658–
1754 (2010).
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politicians, the political calculus changes sharply; suddenly being seen
as favoring Wall Street over Main Street risks losing a lot of votes.
Agency regulators may feel shame and face blowback from having
failed to prevent the crash. Both major new legislation and regulation
may follow as a result. Unless it is given delayed effect, this risks
imposing new obstacles on financial market participants right when they
are already hurting, thereby delaying recovery.71 The new rules may
respond narrowly to the specific problems that cause the crash, failing
to anticipate what might cause the next one. Worse, in responding to the
problems that caused the last crash, the rules might not even be based
on a correct analysis of the causes. Rules passed in great haste in
response to pressure from an uninformed public are at risk of being
poorly thought through. Financial regulation is difficult even under the
best of conditions—trying to do it in a hurry to appease an angry mob
does not make the task more likely to succeed.
The effect of visible crises on the politics of regulation is not unique
to financial regulation. There is now literature on this phenomenon in a
variety of areas.72 Many scholars share a concern that crisis-driven
regulation will not be well-thought through.73 However, financial
regulation may be unique compared to most other areas because similar
heuristics are at work in the underlying financial markets being
regulated. There is a tighter feedback loop and hence a more
pronounced cyclical movement to financial markets and regulation.
Thus, under Model 1 financial regulation tends to go off track at
each stage. During financial booms, when regulations could usefully
reduce market excesses, politicians and regulators are captured by the
financial industry and loosen rules rather than tightening them.
Following crashes, when markets are struggling, politicians impose
onerous and uninformed new rules in response to public panic and
disgust.
Cheerily enough, none of the other two models are really any more
optimistic than Model 1. Rather, they focus even greater ire on one part
of the cycle. Indeed, the contrast with Models 2 and 3 suggests a hidden
silver lining in Model 1. Each of the other two models sees overreaction
in one phase leading to a long-run pattern of non-optimal levels of
regulation—overregulation remaining in place, according to Model 2,
long after the crises which provoke that regulation, and underregulation
remaining a problem that new crisis regulation does not adequately
resolve according to Model 3. In contrast, in Model 1 the long-run
71. GERDING, supra note 5.
72. See generally Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 39 (discussing the role of availability bias
in increasing regulation following a variety of crises and offering a framework for identifying
the consequences of availability bias).
73. Id. at 736–37.
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average level of regulation is roughly right. This suggests a possible
long-run trend for political pressure to lead to financial regulation that is
within hailing distance, at least, of the optimal level, in line with a
minority view within the general public choice literature.74 This Article
explores this idea further after first sketching Models 2 and 3.
B. Overregulation Following a Crisis (Model 2)
Model 2 focuses its ire on the bust phase, when major new
regulation occurs. It is relatively laissez-faire and antiregulation in
outlook, and vigorously decries the new legislation and regulation that
are frequently foolish and usually overly restrictive.75 However, unlike
Model 1, it is much less concerned about underregulation during
financial booms. Model 2 either maintains that such reduced regulation
does not occur at all, or if it does, it is limited and temporary and helps
counteract a dominant long-term trend toward overregulation.
Model 2 agrees with the basic sketch of bust-period overregulation
given above under Model 1. The availability bias induces the public and
politicians to push for new regulation, even though they do not know
what they are doing. Even more informed private and public actors are
acutely conscious of the risks of an unregulated market following a
crisis. Regulation happens too quickly, and it is usually underinformed76
and overreaching.77
Regulation skeptics see a few additional factors that tend to make
overregulation following a crisis even more problematic. For one, they
tend to see concentrated interest groups as less uniformly antiregulation
than the picture sketched earlier under Model 1.78 Some well-organized
interest groups may favor strong regulation. Incumbent firms may
benefit from regulation relative to potential challengers, and hence may
favor many regulations as a form of barriers to entry. Some groups may
favor regulations that promote their personal interests—e.g., plaintiffs’
law firms favoring securities rules that encourage suits; unions and
public employee pension funds favoring rules that promote shareholder
activism; too-big-to-fail banks favoring bailout provisions; and retailers
74. E.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 383–84 (1983).
75. HENDRICKSON, supra note 36, at 246–47; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank:
Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1818–19 (2011); Paul
G. Mahoney, Review, The Pernicious Art of Securities Regulation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1373,
1391–92 (1999); Ribstein, supra note 17, at 82–83; Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in
REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86, 86 (Cary
Coglianese ed., 2012).
76. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 39, 736–37; Macey, supra note 51, at 925–26; Romano,
supra note 75, at 86–87; Stigler, supra note 49, at 11–12.
77. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 39, at 742; Ribstein, supra note 17, at 83.
78. E.g., Bainbridge, supra note 75, at 1818–21; Romano, supra note 75, at 97.
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favoring the limits on payment card fees in the Dodd-Frank Act.
Academics, especially legal academics, are another occasionally
influential group that often favors regulation.79 Thus, while Model 1
tends to see the sudden public attention following a crisis as temporarily
shifting an interest group status quo that usually favors overly weak
regulation (a view that is promoted even more strongly in Model 3),
supporters of Model 2 see concentrated interest group politics as more
balanced, so that in ordinary times both pro and antiregulation
arguments should be heard. But when the uninformed public and
politicians get involved following a crisis, that balance is tipped
strongly in favor of unwise regulation.
Model 2 also presents a somewhat different picture of the regulation
supply side. The Model 1 story above focused on industry group
capture, detailing reasons why both politicians and agency regulators
are likely to favor causes championed by the best-organized interest
groups. Model 2 does not at all deny this tendency, but it also points to a
different tendency. Regulators may prefer strong regulations because it
advances their own interests. This may be seen through a crass personal
influence light—regulators in active agencies have more personal clout
and influence.80 A somewhat more benign variant suggests that
regulators are self-selected, overly representing the viewpoint that the
regulations in question tend to be helpful.81 Either way, there is a
powerful independent tendency for regulators to push for more
regulation. Thus, when the demand side factors align to support more
regulation following a crisis, the regulators seize the moment.
Finally, adherents of Model 2 tend to have rather laissez-faire
preferences generally. They tend to think that markets, including
financial markets, generally work well on their own.82 They also stress
how intellectually difficult financial regulation is.83 The public choice
arguments set out here further strengthen their skepticism concerning
regulation. For all of these reasons, adherents of Model 2 are even
harsher than adherents of Model 1 in their condemnation of regulatory
79. See Ribstein, supra note 17, at 87, 92.
80. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38–
40 (1971). Jonathan Macey argues that this tendency is particularly strong in agencies whose
initial public-regarding purpose has ceased to exist. Bureaucrats will find inefficient ways to
protect their jobs in such circumstances, and Macey argues that the SEC is such an agency.
Macey, supra note 51, at 913.
81. Canice Prendergast, The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 180,
188 (2007).
82. This is consistent with recognizing some tendency to non-optimal boom/bust swings.
See Ribstein, supra note 17, at 79–82 (implying that deregulation in boom periods may lead to
non-optimal outcomes). Even so, it is safe to say that Ribstein was in general, throughout his
scholarship, pretty optimistic about the functioning of markets if left to their own devices.
83. Romano, supra note 75, at 87–89; McDonnell, Don’t Panic!, supra note 12, at 18.
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initiatives following market crashes.
Model 2 has a far different understanding than Model 1 of what
typically happens during market boom phases. As we have seen, Model
2 identifies a variety of interest groups who will lobby in favor of
maintaining or increasing regulation. Thus, even during boom times
when the general public and politicians ignore financial regulation,
interested groups remain to provide some significant pressure in favor
of regulation. Political pressures during a boom are thus more balanced
than conceived under Model 1 (or Model 3, as we shall see). The
inherent push of regulators for maintained or increased regulation
provides another counterforce. The antiregulation normative stance of
adherents of Model 2 also makes them tend to favor any trend towards
deregulation that may occur. Indeed, a particularly pessimistic strand of
Model 2 sees the pressures for regulation as so strong that even during
booms little to no deregulation occurs,84 while more optimistic versions
do expect some welcome (from their perspective) deregulation to occur
during boom periods, although quite possibly not enough to undo the
damage from crisis regulation.
C. Excessive Deregulation During Booms (Model 3)
Model 3 focuses its ire on the deregulation that occurs during
financial bubbles. It largely accepts the picture painted above under
Model 1 for boom phases. The public and most politicians ignore
financial regulation as it loses salience while memories of the last crash
fade.85 Well-organized interest groups within the financial industry
dominate, capturing the regulators who themselves gradually become
less afraid of the shame they would feel should a new crash occur.86 A
general pro-market, antiregulation cultural and political climate takes
hold. In this climate, new financial products and markets go
unregulated, and restrictions on old products and markets gradually
loosen.87
Adherents of Model 3 need not completely deny the pro-regulation
interest groups identified under Model 2. But they argue that,
particularly as bubbles start to accelerate, such interest groups become
increasingly weak relative to those advocating weakened regulation.
Incumbent firms are either themselves profiting from new products and
markets and do not want burdensome regulations imposed on them, or
they find their old products and markets under pressure from the new
competitors, and respond by pushing to loosen or remove old
84. Romano, supra note 75, at 87–88, 94–95.
85. See McDonnell, Don’t Panic!, supra note 12, at 61.
86. See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 88–90, 92–97, 118 (2010).
87. Coffee, supra note 50, at 1026–28, 1078.
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shackles.88 A classic example is savings and loans (S & Ls) in the late
1970s, which faced pressure from new savings devices such as money
market funds. Rather than push to clamp down on the new devices
(which other groups supported), they pushed to remove old limits on
interest rates for deposits and products they could sell. This loosening
allowed S & Ls to engage in risky strategies, which eventually led to
their collapse.89 As incumbents become less tied to strong regulations,
newcomers strongly push deregulation—their whole strategy is based
on identifying new products and markets, and they do not want the
government blocking them. As for the interest groups that favor specific
regulations, they tend to weaken during booms. Pension funds favoring
strong securities laws or retailers favoring limits on card fees are less
focused on these issues during booms, as the money is flowing in
anyway.90 Too-big-to-fail institutions are happy to support deregulation,
confident that when the crash hits they will be saved anyway.91
Adherents of Model 3 also need not completely reject the regulatory
supply side analysis put forth under Model 2. Sure, some regulators may
tend to favor strong rules either for crass personal influence reasons or
because it fits the worldview that makes them become regulators. Still,
during bubbles these forces will lessen and the forces favoring
regulatory capture increase. The lures of the revolving door become
stronger as riches are being made in the private sector. The general
cultural and political climate more and more strongly lionizes the
market and advocates of strong regulation look more and more like outof-it old-timers.92
Seeing such a strong tendency for excessive deregulation during
booms, adherents of Model 3 pin their hopes on new regulations passed
in the wake of crises. They see the public’s and politicians’ new
attention on financial regulation as a potentially very good thing. That
attention makes it possible to counterbalance the excessive dominance
of concentrated interest groups that characterizes most of the financial
and political cycle.93 Yes, it may advance the personal interest of
regulators to write new rules during this time, but that just
counterbalances the excessive capture and the revolving door that
88. See id. at 1027–32 (describing the asymmetrical power, resources, and organization of
interest groups versus regulated industries lobbying for weakened regulation); see also Ribstein,
supra note 17, at 79.
89. KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT,
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 16 (2011); see also George Hane, The Banking Crisis
of the 1980s and Early 1990s: Summary and Implications, in 1 FED. DEPOSIT INS CORP., AN
EXAMINATION OF THE BANKING CRISES OF THE 1980S AND EARLY 1990S 3, 10, 26 (1997).
90. Coffee, supra note 50, at 1030–31.
91. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86, at 173, 178–84.
92. Id. at 95–97.
93. Coffee, supra note 50, at 1021–23, 1036.
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corrupts them during good times. However, more pessimistic versions
of Model 3 fear that regulators will draft crisis regulation to seem tough
to uninformed members of the public, but to actually do little to
interfere with the profits of financial industry players who dominate
political gift giving and have much more say in the process of drafting
rules to implement the legislation.94
Adherents of Model 3 on the normative side see more room for
socially beneficial regulation than do adherents of Model 2. They are
both more distrustful of markets and less distrustful of regulators. They
stress the tremendously destructive possibilities of crashing financial
markets. To them, the Great Depression is not just an aberration, but is
always a looming possibility.95 If true, that makes living with the costs
of financial crises less attractive than pictured under Model 2. On the
other hand, adherents of Model 3 are somewhat more optimistic of the
cognitive abilities of regulators, if freed from corrupting influences, to
create and enforce rules that will improve on the results of unregulated
financial markets. Wise financial regulation may indeed be quite hard,
but those who support it naturally believe that it is not impossible.96
D. Graphing the Models
A few simple illustrative graphs may help to solidify some of the
ideas in the models.97 Let us look at how regulation varies over time,
before and after a financial crisis. For the most part, this Part pictures
regulation as a one-dimensional factor that can vary from lower to
higher levels. This is quite a simplification, although for a few specific
items of financial regulation it is not that much of a simplification—for
instance, capital requirements. At the end of this Part, I will briefly
discuss how one might complicate this simple picture.
The graphs compare a posited optimal level of regulation with actual
levels given the political economy issues described above. The first set
of graphs (Figures 1 through 4) assume that the long-run optimal and
actual levels of regulation remain unchanged, with only cyclical
variations above and below the long run levels preceding and following
a crisis. The second set of graphs (Figures 5 through 11) drop that
94. See Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 663, 671–73 (2004); Krawiec, supra note 64, at 69–70; see also Coffee, supra note 50,
at 1079–80.
95. See KEYNES, supra note 16, at 381–82 (describing the instability of markets as a cause
of war); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008
(2008); MINSKY, supra note 12, at 94–95; JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE
MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 24–26 (2010).
96. See Coffee, supra note 50, at 1029.
97. See id. at 1029–30, 1040–41 (discussing the sine curve of regulation, which suggests
graphs much like many of those that follow).
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assumption and allow for upward and downward movement in the long
run levels of regulation. In all eleven figures, the optimal level of
regulation is shown as a dashed line, and the actual level is shown as a
solid line.
Figure 1 starts by showing the optimal level of regulation. We
assume there is some long-run optimal average level of regulation, RAO.
However, in a boom period preceding a crisis, the optimal level of
regulation increases. To simplify, assume that increase is simply a onetime temporary increase from RAO to RBO.98 Following a crisis, for a
time the optimal level dips below the long run optimum, to RCO. After a
while, the optimal level returns to RAO.
Now, let us see how each of the three models sees the actual level of
regulation compared with the optimum. Start with Model 1, as depicted
in Figure 2. Outside the boom and crisis period, the actual regulation
level is at the optimal level, RAO. As noted above, this is the relatively
optimistic side of Model 1 as compared with the other two models.
However, during the boom period, the actual level of regulation drops to
RB1 rather than rising to RBO, as it optimally should. Following the
crisis, the postcrisis reaction causes the regulatory level to rise above
the average level to RC1, rather than dropping to RCO as it should.
Models 2 and 3 are slightly more complicated. Figure 3 shows
Model 2. The long-run average level of regulation, RA2, is above the
optimal level RAO.99 As with Model 1, the boom level falls below RA2
and the crisis level rises above it, the opposite of the optimal pattern.
The level following the crisis, RC2, is much higher than the optimal
level RCO—the difference reflecting both the procyclicality of the actual
regulation and also the overly high baseline level of regulation. The
analysis gets more complicated in the boom period, though, and Figure
3 shows several possibilities. Although the strength of regulation drops
when it should rise, since the starting point is too high, how one
evaluates that drop depends upon how large the drop is and how big the
gap between average actual and optimal level regulation is. If the level
only drops a small amount, to RB21 > RBO, then the level remains higher
than even the optimal level during a boom (which, you will recall, is
elevated above the average optimum). At this point, one can simply
wish regulation would fall even more. If, however, boom period
regulation drops more to RB22, where RBO > RB22 > RAO, then at that
point the level of regulation is weaker than the optimum for that period
of time, though still above the long run optimal level. How one

98. One could of course assume the optimal level increases in several stages, or in a
smoother upward curve. See infra Figures 5–11.
99. Note that “optimal level” refers to the level that proponents of Model 2 find optimal.
One area where various models disagree, of course, is what that optimal level is.
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evaluates this case is thus a little trickier.100 Should the boom period
regulation fall to RB23 < RAO, it has become, for this period of time, too
weak even by the libertarian standards of Model 2; although if one sees
these cyclical changes as affecting long-run average movements in
regulation, a temporary period of overly weak regulation may still be
beneficial in the long run.
Model 3 is the mirror image of Model 2, as shown in Figure 4. The
long run average level of regulation RA3 is below the optimal level RAO,
reflecting the financial industry’s capture of the regulatory and political
processes. During the boom period, regulation weakens to RB3 rather
than strengthening, putting the level even further below the optimal
boom level of RBO both because of the procyclical movement and
because it is starting from a low baseline. As regulation increases
following the crisis, several possibilities exist. The increase may be
slight enough, as with RC31, that it remains below the optimal postcrisis
level RCO even though regulation has strengthened rather than
weakened, given the low baseline level. Or, the strength of regulation
may rise more, so that RCO < RC32 < RAO, so that the strength is more
than the optimal level following a crisis but still less than the long run
optimum. Finally, one could have RC33 > RAO, so that regulation
temporarily rises above the long-run optimal level.
These simple graphs so far treat the long run average levels of
regulation, both actual and optimal, as constant. This does not fully
capture some of the dynamics underlying the models. That is
particularly true for Models 2 and 3, but let us first consider Model 1.
Figure 5 illustrates one plausible possibility. It assumes that there is a
long run trend of increasing strength in regulation, perhaps reflecting
greater complexity and interconnectedness of financial markets. The
optimal path of regulation follows an upward sloping line, moving
above the trend line at the height of the boom periods and dropping
below the trend line after a crisis, then returning to the trend. The actual
deviation from trend in Figure 5 is relatively modest—beyond the boom
and bust, regulation follows the optimal trend line. It dips below the
trend during the height of the boom, then rises and returns to the trend
following a crisis.
Figure 6 illustrates a somewhat more episodic dynamic under Model
1. Actual regulation stays largely fixed between bust and boom periods.
During the height of the boom, regulation weakens, falling below the
optimal trend level. The postcrisis strengthening of regulation greatly
increases the level, bringing it well above the optimal level. As the
postcrisis stasis kicks in, the optimal level gradually comes to match the
100. It becomes trickier still when we allow the long-run average level to move over time,
with the possibility that the cyclical variations help affect that long-run movement. See infra
Figure 11.
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actual level, then the actual level drops below the optimal again as the
next speculative boom kicks in. As we shall see, this graph may well
come closest to reflecting the core tendencies of American financial
regulation. The actual level of regulation diverges from the optimal
level most of the time—sometimes too high, sometimes too low.
However, over time the level of regulation stays within shouting
distance of the optimal level. There is a second-best story here.
Increasing regulation during a crisis is not what happens in the first-best
scenario. However, that regulatory burst is needed to put in place
essential new rules. It may overshoot, and cause some problems during
the crisis. However, the overshooting corrects itself over time, as the
regulatory level flattens out and then falls during the boom period. That
fall is itself an overcorrection, but some pruning of ill-conceived or
dated rules is helpful. The second-best nature of this pattern reflects
both political problems and inevitable imperfections of human
learning.101
Figures 7 and 8 compare two different sorts of scenarios under
Model 2. Both scenarios assume that the long-run optimal level of
regulation is constant, with cyclical adjustments in the boom and bust
periods.102 In Figure 7, the actual level of regulation is above the
optimal level, but at least the gap does not widen over time. As drawn,
the deregulatory move during the boom period is clearly a good thing—
it brings the level of regulation closer to the optimum, helping to
eliminate the excessively strong regulation that occurs following crises.
Figure 8 sketches a more pessimistic scenario (pessimistic by the
preferences of Model 2 proponents, with their skepticism about
regulation). The boom period deregulation is weak and the postcrisis
regulation is very strong, leading to an upward ratchet effect over time.
The long-run average level of regulation increases over time, even
though the optimal level does not.103
Figures 9 and 10 compare scenarios under Model 3. These scenarios
assume, consistent with this model’s pro-regulatory tilt, that the optimal
level of regulation trends upward over time.104 In Figure 9, the actual
level of regulation also trends upward over time, but it lags below the
optimal level. The postcrisis strengthening, even if not the optimal
timing for increased regulation, helps counterbalance the excessive
deregulation that occurs during booms. Figure 10 shows a more
101. See McDonnell, Don’t Panic!, supra note 12, at 20–29; McDonnell, Of Mises and
Min(sky), supra note 12, at 1281.
102. It is of course also possible to have the long-run level of optimal regulation increasing
or decreasing under Model 2, but the discussion in the text goes far enough to illustrate the key
dynamics.
103. See Romano, supra note 75, at 87, 106.
104. A constant or even decreasing trend is also possible, but not illustrated here.
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pessimistic scenario. The actual level of regulation trends downward
over time. Boom period deregulation brings regulation down, and the
postcrisis strengthening is too weak to counterbalance that deregulation,
perhaps reflecting a tendency for crisis regulation to look good to the
uninformed while in fact allowing industry insiders to stop it from
having much effect.105
E. Extensions and Summary
Even the more complicated graphs in Figures 5 through 10 do not do
reality anything close to full justice. Consider two further
complications. First, as graphed so far, the timing of crises is taken as
fixed, being the same for both the optimal and actual paths of
regulation. That is not correct. The timing of financial crises is in part
endogenous to the path of regulation. Optimal regulatory levels and
timing will probably lead to fewer (and more manageable) crises than
suboptimal regulatory levels. The word “probably” is included because
under Model 2 this may not actually be true—the overly high level of
actual regulation may delay the onset of financial crises, but may do so
at a cost to innovation and growth in the long run that is not worth
paying. But at least under Models 1 and 3, one would expect to see
more distantly spaced crises under the optimal regulatory path.
This Article will not inflict on the patient reader alternative versions
of all of the below graphs to reflect this possibility. Instead, Figure 11
illustrates how Figure 6 (which may best reflect much reality) might
differ once the timing of crises is treated as endogenous. Figure 6,
recall, shows a version of Model 1 in which the optimal level of
regulation trends up over time; the actual level does as well, but more
episodically and procyclically. In Figure 11, the crises, shown by the
vertical dashed lines, are now different for the optimal and actual
regulatory paths (dashed for the optimal, solid for the actual). The first
crisis occurs earlier on the actual path than on the optimal, and indeed in
the time period graphed, there is only one crisis on the optimal path
while there are two on the actual path.
The second complication this section notes, and tries (inadequately)
to address, is that these graphs treat regulation as one-dimensional. That
is of course a wild oversimplification; there are obviously many, many
dimensions to financial regulation. In a big piece of legislation such as
Dodd-Frank, changes may lead to strengthened regulation in some
dimensions and loosened regulation in other dimensions.106
Enforcement of a rule could further be represented as a separate
dimension from the formal rule itself. The optimal level of regulation
105. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 64, at 55–56.
106. See Coffee, supra note 50, at 1049–50.
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may similarly go up in some dimensions and down in others. This
Article does not contain a graph of these dimensions, but suggests one
or two new possibilities beyond Models 1 through 3.
The multidimensional state of actual regulation can be represented at
time t as a vector, (RA1t, RA2t, . . . RAit, . . .), where RAit is the actual level
of regulation at time t along dimension i. The optimal level of regulation
is a similar vector with ith element ROit. Now the deviation of the actual
from the optimal level of regulation is more complicated. The actual
level may be greater than the optimal level along some dimensions, but
less than the optimal level along other dimensions. Consider two
measures of the deviation of actual from optimal regulation along the
full vector at a given period of time. The average error E is simply the
sum of the individual deviations RAit – ROit, i.e. E = ∑(RAit – ROit). Note
that a positive sum suggests that, collectively, regulation tends to be
stronger than optimal, while a negative sum suggests that, collectively,
regulation tends to be weaker than optimal.107 The squared error S is the
sum of the squares of these deviations, i.e. S = ∑ (RAit – ROit)2.
Models 2 and 3 translate fairly straightforwardly into the
multidimensional world. Model 2 posits a large positive value to E,
because most if not all regulation tends to be at or above its optimal
level; it also posits a relatively large value to S. Similarly, Model 3
posits a large and negative value to E and a relatively large value to S,
the size of S depending upon how much the model favors regulation and
how pessimistic it is about political outcomes.
Model 1 becomes more complicated with multiple dimensions,
though. Model 1 suggests that over the course of a cycle the average
level of E tends to be not far from zero, but that E tends to be
significantly positive after new regulation following a crisis and
significantly negative as deregulation kicks in during a boom. But what
does the model say about S? One can imagine a more negative and a
more positive version of the model. A pessimistic version posits that S
is always large and may be trending larger over time. This incorporates
the most pessimistic ideas of all of our models. Along some dimensions
regulation is much stronger than optimal, reflecting Model 2-type
capture by incumbent firms or interest groups such as lawyers. Along
other dimensions regulation is much weaker than optimal, reflecting
Model 3-type lack of organization by the public and industry capture.
The effects roughly cancel out on balance, leading to a small E, but the
large S indicates extreme deviation from an optimal world.
A more positive version of Model 1 suggests that during a boom S
grows as a result of excessive deregulation, and following a crisis S is
107. More generally, one might want to weight dimensions of regulation by their
importance.
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again fairly large due to constricting new regulations that inhibit
recovery. Still, outside of crises, S is not very large and may even tend
to shrink, as regulation moves towards its optimal level over many or
even most dimensions. This trend could reflect several things. One is
simply a process of learning which regulations work and which
regulations do not. Furthermore, some argue that bad regulations tend to
be less effective over time than good regulations because they create
more excessive drag on the economy, which ultimately generates more
opposition and more successful attempts to evade the rules.108 Thus,
when we turn to the historical evidence in Part III, even if there does not
appear to be a systematic tendency to either over- or underregulate
overall, so that Model 1 appears a better fit, it is important to ask
whether history provides more support for a large S or a small S version
of Model 1.
Thus, this Article has sketched a variety of possible models for
understanding cycles in financial regulation. They share many family
resemblances—all presume some degree of endogenous and damaging
cycles in financial markets, all are rooted in public choice theories of
interest group influence and the interests of legislators and regulators,
all recognize how behavioral biases may activate new political players
following visible financial crises, and all recognize some room for
beneficial regulation given market imperfections but also the great
cognitive as well as political difficulty of effective financial regulation.
However, there are major differences in how they analyze political
demand, political supply, and the normative value of regulation. In each
area, Models 2 and 3 stake out the extreme points while Model 1 falls in
between. For political demand in boom time, Model 3 sees dominance
by concentrated industry groups that oppose regulation while Model 2
sees a mix of concentrated groups, some of which favor strong
regulation. For demand following a crisis, Model 3 sees a welcome
strengthening of forces favoring the public interest while Model 2 sees
dominance by uninformed antimarket forces. On the supply side, Model
2 lays more stress on the self-interest of bureaucrats in strong
regulation. In their normative models of markets and financial
regulation, Model 2 lays more stress on the general ability of markets to
get most matters roughly correct and the intellectual challenge of
regulation, whereas Model 3 is less sanguine about markets and more
sanguine about regulation. Table 1 above summarizes these similarities
and differences.

108. See Becker, supra note 74, at 383, 388.
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III. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
Choosing among these competing models is no easy task. They
differ greatly in their underlying understanding of financial markets and
politics, in their weighing of conflicting empirical evidence, and in deep
normative commitments. Ultimately, available empirical evidence is too
weak and ambiguous to definitively tell us which model best fits the
world. All analysts bring their own preconceptions to the topic, and
those preconceptions are strong enough to allow each to see what they
are looking for. Still, a quick look at the history of U.S. financial
regulation does help shed some light on the competing models.109
The grandest cycle in financial regulation began with the New Deal
financial reforms following the crash that led to the Great Depression.
The new regulatory system basically remained—remains—in place, but
the deregulatory cycle began several decades later, in the late 1960s or
early 1970s.
The New Deal essentially created federal securities regulation. The
Securities Act of 1933110 and the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934111 created the core of modern federal securities regulation. The
1934 Act also created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
the federal agency that oversees and implements securities regulation.112
Later in the decade, the Investment Company Act of 1940113 and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940114 added regulation to additional
elements of financial markets. These acts were clearly inspired by
securities market abuses, which were perceived as having helped bring
about the stock market crash. Moreover, the Great Depression helped
put into power a Democratic Party willing to enact heavy regulation.
Even more crucial were reforms in banking regulation brought about by
the Banking Act of 1933: the creation of the FDIC and deposit
insurance, and the separation of commercial and investment banking.115
A final pillar of the New Deal system was the Bretton Woods system of
fixed exchange rates and international capital controls, which limited
the flow of capital around the world.116
109. More illuminating still would be a comparative examination of the history of financial
regulation in a number of jurisdictions, but that is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally
BANCA D’ITALIA, FINANCIAL MARKET REGULATION IN THE WAKE OF FINANCIAL CRISES: THE
HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE (Alfredo Gigliobianco & Gianni Toniolo eds., 2009) (examining the
regulatory responses to financial crises by a variety of countries in an effort to determine
whether such responses form a pattern of regulatory bias).
110. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74.
111. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881.
112. Id. § 4, 48 Stat. at 885.
113. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789.
114. Investment Advisors Act of 1940, Pub. L. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847.
115. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-66, §§ 8, 10, 14, 48 Stat. 162, 168, 181, 184.
116. Michael D. Bordon & Barry Eichengreen, Preface to A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE
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It took several decades for the New Deal system of financial
regulation to start to significantly loosen. The first part of the system to
collapse was Bretton Woods, which began to wobble in the late 1960s
and failed completely in the early 1970s.117
Deregulation of domestic finance began in earnest around the same
time, in the early 1970s.118 Inflation and high interest rates stimulated
creation of new financial products like mutual market funds.119
Regulators allowed these new products, and the products put pressures
on established institutions such as banks and savings and loan
companies.120 The established institutions, in turn, pushed for lightened
rules regulating what products they could offer, markets they could
enter, and interest they could charge. Deregulation took the form of
lenient interpretation of existing rules, revised regulations, and statutory
changes.121 A nice example of deregulation by agency interpretation,
from a slightly later period, is the defanging of the limits on transactions
between banks and their affiliates in § 23A of the Federal Reserve
Act.122
Deregulation continued in the 1980s and ’90s. The market for
securitization of mortgages and other financial products took off, with
relaxed rules helping to create the possibility. Credit default swaps and
other exotic new derivatives were created, and regulators did little or
nothing.123 Financial companies diversified in ways previously
prohibited, and regulators and politicians responded by increasingly
weakening and then repealing the Glass-Steagall Act.124 The market for
subprime loans took off, and regulators again did little or nothing.125 In
the area of securities law, the Supreme Court turned to more constrained
interpretations,126 and then Congress passed the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995,127 both institutions acting out of a
BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: LESSONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM at xi (Michael D.
Bordo & Barry Eichengreen eds., 1993).
117. Peter M. Garber, The Collapse of the Bretton Woods Fixed Exchange Rate System, in
A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE BRETTON WOODS SYSTEM: LESSONS FOR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
REFORM 461, 461–63 (Michael D. Bordo & Barry Eichengreen eds., 1993).
118. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 89, at 16.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 65.
121. Id. at 16; GERDING, supra note 5, at 12.
122. See Omarova, supra note 54, at 1729.
123. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86, at 89; see also Coffee, supra note 50, at 1033–34
n.56.
124. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999).
125. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 89, at 25–32.
126. See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191
(1994); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–37 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976).
127. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
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concern that shareholder class actions were getting out of hand.
The exact role that all of this deregulation played in helping cause
the financial crisis of 2007–2008 is heavily debated, but it seems likely
it was a major cause.128 Several years after the crisis, Congress
responded with the most extensive new regulation of financial
institutions and markets since the New Deal, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).129 The Act
is quite long and complex, and its merits are highly debated.130
Moreover, the ultimate effect of most of the Act depends on rules and
studies that are mostly still in progress. So, at this point it is far too soon
to evaluate which model best describes Dodd-Frank. Was it an illconceived overreaction, as Model 2 would suggest?131 Was it a needed
correction to years of deregulation and new financial products?132 Was
it a facially liberal reform that will turn out to have no teeth as
implemented?133 Time will tell. Maybe.
Less dramatic cycles occurred before the Great Depression.
Following the Panic of 1907, Congress created the Federal Reserve.134
The Panic of 1907 also caused many states to pass anti-bucket shop
laws and a few states to experiment in deposit insurance, and it would
not be a surprise if that panic played a role in state adoption of blue sky
laws, which started to be enacted shortly afterward.135
The story before then looks somewhat different. Most financial
regulation in the United States before the twentieth century occurred at
the state rather than the federal level, although the great Panics of 1873
128. E.g., ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 89, at 204; JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 86, at
156; RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE
WORLD ECONOMY 155 (2010); NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A
CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF ECONOMICS 183, 266– 69 (2010); STIGLITZ, supra note 95, at
25.
129. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also Omarova, supra note 54, at 1685.
130. E.g., VIRAL A. ACHARYA ET AL., REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT
AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 5–6, (2011); DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW
FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED)
CONSEQUENCES 14–15 (2011); McDonnell, Don’t Panic!, supra note 12, at 47 (“On balance, the
Dodd-Frank Act consists of a series of plausible cowardly interventions in the face of the
problems that the crisis has revealed.”); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed
and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 954 (2011)
(“Dodd-Frank’s provisions fall far short of the changes that would be needed to prevent future
taxpayer-financed bailouts and to remove other public subsidies for [‘too-big-to-fail’]
institutions.”).
131. See Bainbridge, supra note 75, at 1782–83; Romano, supra note 75, at 86.
132. See Coffee, supra note 50, at 1048–49; McDonnell, Don’t Panic!, supra note 12, at
63–64.
133. See Krawiec, supra note 64, at 83–84.
134. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913).
135. HENDRICKSON, supra note 36, at 96 (deposit insurance).
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and 1893 led to proposals for reform at the federal level. The nation’s
first stock crash in 1792 led two leading commercial states, New York
and Pennsylvania, to enact legislation to regulate securities trading.136
The National Bank Act of 1864 implemented a federal system of
banking regulation.137 It was mainly a response to the government’s
need to raise money during the Civil War, but it was also affected by the
Panics of 1857 and 1860. The Panic of 1893 did not result in major
national reforms, but it helped spur reform movements and
progressivism. William Jennings Bryan became the Democratic
nominee based on his Cross of Gold speech in 1896;138 several years
earlier, as a congressman, he proposed federal deposit insurance.139
Even this brief history suggests that some extreme versions of
Models 2 and 3, which see little movement in their preferred direction
even during the most favorable phases, are not generally accurate. Some
Model 2 advocates see little tendency to deregulate even during
booms,140 but the extensive deregulation that began in the 1970s
strongly suggests that this version of Model 2 is wrong. Roberta
Romano, the best proponent of Model 2, downplays the amount of
deregulation that occurred, and points to how long it took. For instance,
over six decades passed from the passage of Glass-Steagall to its
repeal.141 But the gradual erosion of Glass-Steagall began several
decades before its complete repeal. The collapse of Bretton Woods
came earlier still,142 and by the mid-1970s rules on usury and limits on
new financial products began to seriously loosen.143 Another major
form of deregulation, which Romano ignores, occurred as regulators
failed to respond to new financial innovations.144 The almost immediate
backlash against Dodd-Frank also suggests that the latest round of
regulatory tightening will see some loosening before long.145
And yet, there does seem to be a related truth that this version of
136. BANNER, supra note 33, at 171–74.
137. National Bank Act of 1864, 13 Stat. 99 (1864).
138. William Jennings Bryan, 1860-1925, NEB. STATE HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.nebraska
history.org/lib-arch/research/manuscripts/politics/bryanwj.htm (last updated Feb. 25, 2011).
139. Eugene N. White, Dodd–Frank, Meet William Jennings Bryan, WALL ST. J., July 13,
2010, at A17, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487040756045753569
31846676058.html (acknowledging that Congressman William Jennings Bryan proposed
deposit insurance in response to the Panic of 1893).
140. See Romano, supra note 75, at 96.
141. Id. at 87.
142. See Garber, supra note 117, at 461.
143. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 89, at 16.
144. GERDING, supra note 5, at 13.
145. Indeed, after I wrote the first draft of this Article, Congress passed the JOBS Act,
which loosened securities regulation in a number of dimensions. Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). This occurred close enough to the last
crisis that it is indeed a rather striking counterexample to my core procyclicality claim.
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Model 2 gestures towards. Although the strength and effectiveness of
financial regulation may ebb and flow with market cycles, there does
seem to be an upward tendency. Even with the significant deregulation
of the last few decades, before Dodd-Frank a much stronger and more
extensive set of rules were in place than before the New Deal. During
the boom period we cut back on rules created in the Great Depression,
but we were very far from eliminating those rules completely.
So, how should we evaluate the effectiveness of the major regulatory
initiatives following crises? Dodd-Frank is still too recent, but what
about the reforms that followed the crises of 1907 and 1929? The
Federal Reserve was the main response to the Panic of 1907.146 Many
strong criticisms of the Fed can be made. Its performance during the
Great Depression was poor.147 It has been a spotty banking regulator,
getting far too caught up in the deregulatory movement that preceded
the latest crash.148 Some might think we would be better off with no
Federal Reserve at all.149 But not many would think so. On balance, the
Federal Reserve looks like a quite useful response to financial crisis.
As for the New Deal legislation, deposit insurance and the FDIC
have ended contagious runs on conventional banks. Deposit insurance
does create some moral hazard, and banking regulation and supervision
do not fully eliminate increased risk-taking. But, on balance, the FDIC
seems to have created much more stability; its benefits clearly seem to
outweigh its costs. Few people are calling for the elimination of deposit
insurance for banks; there is a reason for this.
The net benefits of securities regulation have been somewhat more
debated. Some empirical studies have suggested that regulation has
been, on balance, ineffective or harmful.150 Other studies have
suggested positive effects.151 Studies also differ on the net benefits of
the efforts of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 to

146. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1867–1960, at 168–72 (1963).
147. Id. at 407–11, 418–19.
148. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 89, at 19–20.
149. For example, Congressman and presidential candidate Ron Paul. See About the Audit,
AUDIT THE FED: A COALITION FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY, http://www.auditthefed.com/aboutthe-audit (last visited May 19, 2013) (proposing a bill that mandates unrestricted audits of the
Federal Reserve by the Government Accountability Office).
150. E.g., George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 153 (1973); George J. Stigler,
Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117, 121–24 (1964).
151. E.g., Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J.
BUS. 382, 382 (1964); Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Mandated
Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 121 Q.J. ECON. 399, 412–
13, 446–47 (2006).
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scale back securities fraud litigation.152 The most persuasive evidence is
a body of comparative quantitative research that suggests that U.S.-style
protections of shareholders and creditors help lead to deeper financial
markets.153 Most of the developed world has copied American securities
regulation. Maybe everyone has gotten it wrong, but the pattern is at
least suggestive.
The most important part of the New Deal financial legislation that is
hard to justify is Glass-Steagall. The link of that provision to the causes
of the Great Depression does not seem very plausible, nor is there a
strong story tying the end of Glass-Steagall to the latest crisis. If
anything, evidence suggests that engaging in securities activities helped
banks diversify, which made them safer. Thus, increased securities
activities did not make banks more likely to fail.154 Glass-Steagall
prevented the development of universal banks, which have been useful
in countries such as Germany and Japan.155 Still, it must be noted that
some extraordinarily good economists disagree and do see the end of
Glass-Steagall as one of the causes of the crisis.156
Even harder to justify is Regulation Q (promulgated in 1933 to
implement elements of the Banking Act of 1933), which limited the
amount banks could charge on various kinds of deposits.157 Most
economists find almost all price ceilings, including usury laws, hard to
justify.
Before the great crisis of 2007–2008, we had the smaller crisis of the
152. E.g., Ashiq Ali & Sanjay Kallapur, Securities Price Consequences of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and Related Events, 76 ACCT. REV. 431, 456 (2001)
(demonstrating that shareholders in “high-litigation-risk industries react negatively to the [Act’s]
restrictions on their ability to bring securities-related lawsuits” (emphasis in original)); Stephen
J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 598, 598 (2007) (demonstrating that the Act reduced nuisance litigation,
meritorious claims that were unprofitable, and non-nuisance claims that lacked hard evidence);
Marilyn F. Johnson, Ron Kasznik & Karen K. Nelson, Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 5 REV. ACCT. STUD. 217, 218 (2000) (finding that the
Act was wealth-increasing for shareholders of high-technology firms; produced a more positive
market reaction for firms that are at a greater risk of litigation; and decreased the incremental
probability of a firm being sued for committing fraud); Michael A. Perino, Did the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 976 (demonstrating that just
as many class actions were filed after the Act was passed as before, but the Act improved the
overall case quality when the key provisions were strictly interpreted).
153. Thorsten Beck, Asli Demigüç-Kunt & Ross Levine, Law and Finance: Why Does
Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 653, 673 (2003); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 285, 298–99, 310, 327 (2008).
154. HENDRICKSON, supra note 36, at 161.
155. See Brett McDonnell, Banks and Venture Capitalists: Are the New Rules Too Tough,
Too Weak, or Just Right?, 1 MINN. J. BUS. L. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 13, 14–15 (2002).
156. E.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 95, at 15.
157. Regulation Q, 12 C.F.R. § 217.2 (1938).
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dot-com boom and bust, which initiated a small recession in the early
2000s.158 In the wake of that crisis and related scandals such as Enron
and WorldCom, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).159
To some extent the jury is still out on SOX. At least one element, the
auditor internal control certification requirement,160 seems to have been
a costly mistake.161 Other rules, such as a new regulatory system for
auditors and independence requirements for auditors and directors, do
not seem to have been as clearly misguided and costly, although it is
also unclear whether they did much good. Overall opinion on the
effectiveness of SOX is mixed, with some arguing that it did some
modest good,162 others arguing that it is hard to tell if its costs were
greater than its benefits,163 and yet others arguing that it did much
harm.164
On balance, the evidence on the effects of major crisis-related
regulatory innovations is ambiguous and debated. A staunch skeptic of
regulation would condemn all of the New Deal financial regulation and
the Federal Reserve Act to boot. Jill Hendrickson, for instance, argues
that most banking regulation actually leads to increased risk-taking and
fragility in the system.165 There is some evidence to support such a
claim, but on balance it seems implausible. Although surely there are
problems with parts of the New Deal legislation, and the Federal
Reserve is far from perfect, still financial markets are much more stable
and less damaging in their crises than they would likely be without that
legislation. And yet, regulation does seem to go too far at times. GlassSteagall and elements of SOX (at least § 404(b)) are arguably evidence
of this. The extensive barriers to entry and price ceilings that
characterized much bank regulation in the decades after World War II
are clearer evidence. At least some of the deregulation that occurred in
recent decades was justified. Thus, the basic story of Model 1 seems to
find a good deal of support in the history of American financial
158. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform
(And It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 923 (2003).
159. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745; see also Roberta
Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE
L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005).
160. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404(b), 116 Stat. 745, 789.
161. Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 31–32 (2002).
162. E.g., Cunningham, supra note 158, at 987–88; Donald Langevoort, The Social
Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817, 1853 (2007); Brett H. McDonnell,
SOx Appeals, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 533.
163. E.g., John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J.
ECON. PERSP. 91, 92 (2007).
164. E.g., Ribstein, supra note 161, at 61; Romano, supra note 159, at 1602–03.
165. HENDRICKSON, supra note 36, at 15, 161.
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regulation over the past century.
If, as suggested at the end of Part II, regulation is multidimensional,
does it trend towards the right level in most dimensions, or is it too high
in some and too low in others? In other words, does the world reflect a
high S or low S version of Model 1?166 Surely the answer is a mixed
bag. The pessimistic high S story has some plausibility, and fits
elements of the historical record. Yet, maybe over the long run, the
more pernicious types of regulation do tend to disappear and the more
helpful types remain, perhaps because clearly bad rules ultimately
generate greater costs and more opposition.167 Perhaps, too, it is simply
a good thing to have periodic strong changes in the balance of political
lobbying power over financial regulation—it allows for more
innovation and variation in rules than would otherwise occur, and thus
allows for learning over time, which is particularly valuable given the
difficulty of getting such regulation right. There is at least some broad
historical evidence of bad rules disappearing while good rules remain.
Limits on branch banking and interest rates have largely disappeared in
banking law, and activity limits like Glass-Steagall have been reduced,
while regulation has come to focus more on capital requirements,
soundness supervision, deposit insurance, and resolution of failed
institutions. That regulatory scheme seems relatively well-focused on
the real risks that banks pose.
Ideally, expanded regulation would occur during boom times and the
cutbacks would occur following crises. However, political realities tied
in part to underlying human limitations of cognition and attention stop
that from happening. If we are going to achieve needed regulation, it is
mostly going to have to happen following crises. If we are going to cut
back on unnecessary regulation, it is mostly going to have to happen
during booms. At least under Model 1 (unlike Models 2 and 3) the longrun average for the level of regulation is roughly optimal, even if the
timing of changes is not. This is not the first-best scenario; it is at most
third best. But that beats sixth best.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES
This Part surveys a variety of procedural responses that we already
use or that we could use to try to dampen financial regulatory cycles.
First, it is useful to consider procedures that tend to slow down the
passage of new statutes and regulations. Why start here? If the problems
are deregulation during booms and overregulation following crises,
166. Recall that a high S indicates high levels of variation from the optimal level in many
dimensions, with overregulation along some dimensions and underregulation along other
dimensions, while a low S indicates that regulation is relatively close to the optimal level along
most dimensions. See supra Part II.E.
167. Becker, supra note 74, at 373, 396.
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putting in place some road bumps to slow down change may well make
sense. However, this Article’s analysis also suggests a problem with
efforts to impede change: in many instances, changes may be beneficial,
even if the particular regulation or deregulation is not ideal. In
particular, new rules following crises are often more helpful than
harmful. Procedures that go too far in blocking change would risk
blocking such beneficial new rules.
American law is filled with ways in which we slow down new rules.
As for federal statutes, the constitutional requirements of bicameralism
and presentment require the approval of a majority of senators and
representatives, and the President.168 Congressional rules such as the
committee process, the control of house leadership over the agenda, and
the filibuster in the Senate, put further roadblocks in place.169 For
administrative regulations, the notice-and-comment process, judicial
review of both procedure and substance, and required cost–benefit
analyses, among other things, create obstacles to passage of new
regulations.170 All three of our models appreciate the presence of such
obstacles during at least one phase of the regulatory cycle. Model 1
appreciates the presence of obstacles in both phases, since it sees a
tendency to overregulate during a crisis and then to deregulate too much
during booms. Model 2 supports limiting new rules following a crisis,
while Model 3 supports limiting deregulatory initiatives during a boom.
But the effects of roadblocks are ambiguous. For Model 2, new
initiatives should be encouraged during booms when they tend to lead to
deregulation, while for Model 3 new rules should be encouraged during
a crisis when they tend to lead to effective new regulation. Moreover,
insofar as one buys Part III’s conclusion that Model 1 may be a secondor third-best process given underlying human limitations, then perhaps
we do not really want to hinder new rules. The timing of the rules may
be all wrong, but at least the rules do in the long run make needed
changes in the regulatory system. In contrast, if one tends to believe
Model 2, then obstacles look more promising—yes, they may block
useful deregulatory initiatives during booms, but since such
deregulation tends to only partially undo the damage wrought by crisis
rules, that cost is likely outweighed by the benefits of blocking
misguided rules following a crisis.
What one really wants are intelligent roadblocks, which tend to
block bad new rules but not beneficial ones. That is of course hard, but
we do try. Within Congress, one hopes that the committee system will
tend to sift through conflicting arguments and sort out those proposals
168. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
169. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 39, at 747.
170. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946); see also
Krawiec, supra note 64, at 55–56.
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with the best chances of producing good results. The expertise of
committee members and their staff, combined with the chance for
interested parties to present evidence and arguments at hearings, may
increase the intelligence of the process. On the other hand, the
specialization of committee members is also more likely to lead to their
capture by special interests, either through focused lobbying or through
the selection bias that determines who winds up on which committee.
The committee hearing process presents a vital path for getting
important information to congressional decision makers, but it also
provides a way for financial industry insiders, who have most of that
information, to unduly influence decision makers.
Similar advantages and disadvantages appear during the process of
notice-and-comment rulemaking by specialized agencies. Agency
specialization allows for useful expertise, and the comment process can
generate useful information for evaluating proposals.171 But those
specialized agencies are also subject to capture, and the comment
process is often dominated by informed industry insiders.172
Hard-look review. Judicial review of administrative regulations
seems a promising strategy for intelligently weeding out the worst of
new rules. Courts may strike down regulations that are arbitrary and
capricious.173 One might hope that this works as an intelligent roadblock
in both phases of the regulatory cycle, blocking both the worst of
expanded regulation following a crisis and the worst of deregulatory
rule changes during boom periods. Courts have varied as to how much
scrutiny they engage in, but sometimes they have engaged in hard-look
scrutiny, which examines fairly closely how agencies justify new
regulations. There has been much debate among administrative law
scholars as to the effects of hard-look scrutiny.174 There is a tradeoff. If
courts engage in only weak scrutiny, they will screen out few
regulations. On the other hand, if they engage in stricter scrutiny, there
is a risk of striking down worthy regulations. Arguably this has already
happened for one important new regulation under Dodd-Frank, the
SEC’s proxy access rule. The D.C. Circuit’s decision striking down the
171. Krawiec, supra note 64, at 56.
172. Id. at 82.
173. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
174. E.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Response, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking:
A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 528–29 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld,
Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice
and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 486–87 (1997); Matthew C. Stephenson, A
Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN L. REV. 753, 754–56
(2006); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review,
119 YALE L.J. 2, 12–13 (2009); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the
Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 19501990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1420–21 (2012).
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proxy access rule is rather arbitrary and capricious in its
characterization of the SEC’s justification of proxy access as arbitrary
and capricious.175 If the D.C. Circuit were to behave like this in
reviewing many of the new regulations that agencies must write under
Dodd-Frank, it is not at all clear how those agencies, inundated with
rulemaking mandates, will ever be able to adequately justify their work
product. One hopes that the proxy access case is an aberration. On the
other hand, for an advocate of Model 2, the case gives hope that courts
will protect us from a series of rushed and sloppy new rules under a
mostly misguided statute.176 This illustrates the trickiness of
administrative fixes to the regulatory cycles. Yes, we do want to
dampen the excessive procyclical nature of the cycle. And yet, given the
inevitable cognitive and political limits of regulation, both phases of the
cycle serve useful purposes, even if their timing is not optimal.
Procedures, like hard-look review, that impose too harsh a limit on
either phase of the cycle risk throwing out much good along with some
bad.
Agency independence. Creating independent agencies is a standard
procedural strategy for insulating regulators from political pressure.
Examples in U.S. financial regulation include the Federal Reserve and
the SEC. By insulating agencies from political influence, independence
can help reduce some of the procyclicality that flows from the demand
for regulation. The Federal Reserve’s setting of monetary policy is an
interesting example—achieving countercyclical policy is a particularly
crucial goal in monetary policy, and the Fed’s independence is seen as a
critical component of its relative success.177 Of course, even in
monetary policy the Fed has not always been successful in making its
actions countercyclical,178 and it has been less successful in the area of
175. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2011). For critiques of the
case, see James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting
the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1813
(2012); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and Economics of Business
Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. CORP. L. 101, 120–22 (2012); J. Robert Brown, Jr., Shareholder
Access and Uneconomic Economic Analysis: Business Roundtable v. SEC, DENV. U. L. REV.
ONLINE, (Sept. 30, 2011, 2:57 PM), http://www.denverlawreview.org/online-articles/
2011/9/30/shareholder-access-and-uneconomic-economic-analysis-business.html.
176. Kuran and Sunstein suggest greater judicial scrutiny as a way to protect again illconceived crisis-driven laws. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 39, at 758–59.
177. As Federal Reserve chair William Martin purportedly said: “The Federal Reserve, as
one writer put it, after the recent increase in the discount rate, is in the position of the chaperone
who has ordered the punch bowl removed just when the party was really warming up.” Yoram
Bauman, Martin’s “Punch Bowl” Quote: A Semi-definitive Citation, STAND-UP ECONOMIST
(Mar. 27, 2011), http://www.standupeconomist.com/blog/martins-punch-bowl-quote-a-semidefinitive-citation.
178. Many cite overly low interest rates as a primary cause of the housing bubble that led
to the latest financial crisis. See, e.g., Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the
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financial regulation, in part because it seems to have seen regulation as
less central to its identity than monetary policy.
Interestingly, and perhaps disturbingly, across many countries,
including the United States, the reaction to the latest financial crisis has
somewhat decreased the importance of independence among financial
regulators.179 It appears that politicians want regulators to be more
directly accountable to them given the renewed focus on the importance
of financial regulation. In the United States, this tendency appears in the
decision to make the Secretary of the Treasury the chair of the new
Financial Stability Oversight Council, which coordinates federal
financial rulemaking.180 However, agency independence still appears as
an important strategy in parts of the Dodd-Frank Act, most importantly
in the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).181 The
CFPB has a budget that is independent of Congress,182 one of the most
important elements of agency independence. However, its budgetary
independence has come under attack from opponents—congressional
Republicans have vowed to block appointments to the CFPB unless its
budgetary independence is reduced, among other conditions.183 Greater
accountability to Congress presumably serves some worthy purposes.
However, from the perspective of smoothing the regulatory cycle and
making it less procyclical, decreasing the budgetary independence of
the CFPB is clearly a bad idea. Indeed, preferred reforms would seem to
move in the opposite direction, strengthening the power of independent
agencies.184 For instance, from the perspective of the issues considered
Housing Bubble and the Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY
120, 121–23 (2009). Even if that is right, though, it is not at all clear that the explanation for that
monetary policy is political. Indeed, I’m inclined to agree with Scott Sumner: “[W]e were all
taught in grad school that central banks needed to be independent to resist public pressure to
inflate. I’m inclined to discount most public choice explanations of monetary policy failure, and
fall back on the ‘It’s the stupidity, stupid.’ explanation.” Scott Sumner, Four Short Posts,
THEMONEYILLUSION (Apr. 4, 2012), http://www.themoneyillusion.com/?p=13805.
179. Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 CAL. L.
REV. 327, 332 (2013).
180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 111(b)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376, 1392–93 (2010).
181. Id. §§ 1001–1100H, 124 Stat. at 1955–2113.
182. Id. § 1017(a), 124 Stat. at 1979.
183. 44 U.S. Sens. to Obama: No Accountability, No Confirmation, RICHARD SHELBY,
UNITED STATES SENATOR OF ALABAMA (May 5, 2011), http://shelby.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/newsreleases?ContentRecord_id=893bc8b0-2e73-4555-8441-d51e0ccd1d17.
While this Article was in the editing process, a deal concerning the use of filibusters for
executive appointments led to the Senate confirming Richard Cordray as director of the CFPB.
Binyamin Appelbaum, Vote Ushers in New Era of Oversight of Lending Practices, N.Y. TIMES
(July 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/business/cordray-confirmed-as-head-offinancial-watchdog-after-long-wait.html?_r=0.
184. However, I do believe that one of the other suggested Republican reforms makes
sense. They suggest that a five-person commission, rather than a single director head the
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in this Article, it would be better to have the Financial Stability
Oversight Council185 chaired by the Chair of the Federal Reserve rather
than the Secretary of the Treasury.
Sunset clauses. Roberta Romano has recently suggested sunset
clauses as part of all new financial regulation.186 Under this proposal, a
review panel would evaluate crisis-driven financial regulation after a set
period (Romano mentions five or six years).187 The proposal appears in
Romano’s suggestion that Congress would need to reauthorize the
legislation after receiving the panel’s report, or else the legislation
would lapse. This proposal is attractive from the perspective of Model 2
(Romano is a leading Model 2 proponent). Since crisis regulation is
likely to be inefficient according to Model 2, and since that Model
views the political process as least trustworthy immediately following
crises, the sunset proposal would lead to a welcome pruning of mostly
bad new rules.188
The sunset proposal is obviously problematic from the perspective of
Model 3. It would undermine good crisis rules, and put them at risk
during boom periods, which feature a tendency to deregulate in
excess.189 Romano argues that even if one accepts this perspective
(which she of course does not), having review of a regulation performed
publically is better than subverting the rule in the dark through a
captured agency process.190 From the perspective of Model 1, there is
some value to having a public, more transparent review process, both to
shed a light on industry involvement and also to scrutinize crisis rules
that do tend to overshoot. However, if the sunset proposal creates a
default whereby the rule will terminate without new congressional
action, the critique of agency capture during boom periods shared by
Models 1 and 3 does create great concern. By the time a rule comes up
for review, Congress is likely to face strong pressure to favor the
financial industry. Expecting Congress to renew even good but tough
rules during such times seems foolhardy. It is more defensible to simply
require a study at some point after a rule takes effect. Indeed, the many
mandated reports to Congress under Dodd-Frank are a variant of this
agency. Responsible Consumer Financial Protection Regulations Act of 2011, S. 737, 112th
Cong.; see also S.737—Responsible Consumer Financial Protection Regulations Act of 2011,
OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/112-s737/show (last visited May 19, 2013).
That might well be a useful way to include more viewpoints within the agency’s decision
making.
185. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 101–176, 124 Stat. 1376, 1391–1442 (2010).
186. Romano, supra note 75, at 95–96.
187. Id. at 95.
188. Id. at 96.
189. See Coffee, supra note 50, 122–23.
190. Romano, supra note 75, 96–99.
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more modest idea. One could give these reports more oomph than they
possess under Dodd-Frank by setting up a panel of independent experts,
rather than the implementing agency, to review the law after (say) five
years, and giving clear criteria to that panel, as Romano suggests.191 The
review requirement could also stipulate that the review panel should
formulate proposed amendments to the legislation, including the
possibility of complete repeal, if its review suggests such amendments
would be desirable.
Contrarians. Dan Schwarcz and I have called for the increased use
of “regulatory contrarians.”192 Regulatory contrarians are defined by
three features: affiliation with a particular regulatory body while
simultaneously enjoying meaningful independence from that body,
persuasive influence over the agency by virtue of its position, and being
limited to no regulatory authority of their own.193 These regulatory
contrarians can review both existing and proposed new rules as well as
financial market developments, and suggest areas where current rules
do not seem to respond adequately to market risks. They can be a way
of combating destructive deregulation during boom periods while also
promoting useful regulation following crises—their independence and
the fact that they themselves do not write rules help limit their exposure
to political pressure. The hard part, though, is finding ways to increase
the chances that agencies will actually listen to the recommendations of
regulatory contrarians. Existing examples of contrarian institutions
include the Taxpayer Advocate Service within the IRS, offices of public
counsel in some states, inspectors general, and the Center for Insurance
Policy and Research.194 Schwarcz and I argue that Dodd-Frank includes
a number of potentially useful contrarian institutions. Perhaps most
significant is the new Office of Financial Research (OFR).195 Other
191. Id. at 95.
192. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 52, at 1681–82 (2011). For similar suggestions,
see JAMES R. BARTH, GERARD CAPRIO, JR. & ROSS LEVINE, GUARDIANS OF FINANCE: MAKING
REGULATORS WORK FOR US 215–24 (2012) (describing a proposal for a new institution called
the “Sentinel” to “improve the system for selecting, interpreting, implementing, and adapting
regulations”); Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in
Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 642 (2012).
193. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 52, at 1645–46.
194. Id. at 1654–66.
195. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 151–56, 124 Stat. 1376, 1412–20 (2010). I can’t say I am thrilled with what I have seen of
the OFR’s start in life. In particular, the initial membership of the Financial Research Advisory
Committee does not fill me with great hope. Membership of the Financial Research Advisory
Committee, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY (Nov. 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/
ofr/about/Documents/OFR_FRAC_Member_Bios_FINAL.pdf. For one thing, it is all
economists, whereas a more interdisciplinary group would bring a wider range of perspectives
to the table. Moreover, the list of economists seems strikingly industry-dominated, and does not
contain a large number of known contrarian thinkers likely to ask serious and deep questions
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examples within the Act include the Federal Insurance Office, the
Council of Inspectors General on Financial Oversight, the Investor
Advisory Committee and the Office of the Investor Advocate within the
SEC, and the Consumer Advisory Board within the CFPB.196 To similar
effect is the suggestion of outside peer review of agency rules.197
Mandated studies. Dodd-Frank mandates that administrative
agencies conduct dozens of studies concerning various perceived
problems. One analysis found that the Act dictates 243 new
rulemakings, 67 studies, and 22 periodic reports.198 These serve a
potentially useful role in displacing the regulatory energy that
immediately follows a financial crisis. Regulating too soon can lead to
misguided rules, if those setting them do not fully understand what they
are doing, and can also restrict financial markets during a time when
they are already suffering. Mandated studies give the agencies time to
reflect, gather more information, and research possible ways to address
problems revealed by the latest crisis. They also push into the future any
new rules which may result from the crisis, which reduces or eliminates
the problem of implementing new restrictions when markets are
struggling.199
The biggest challenge for this strategy is that the political will to
support new rules may have disappeared by the time the mandated
studies are completed. But at least sometimes, bureaucrats’ interest in
strong rules may combine with some lingering populist pressure to
regulate. Most of the mandated studies are combined with a requirement
to report to Congress on the results; these reports may provide a way for
those with an interest in new regulation to help prolong general political
attention and pressure.200 The new regulatory contrarians may also
champion possible rules suggested by studies.201 There is a careful
balance required for this strategy to succeed—the time for studies must
be long enough to allow for meaningful reflection and learning and to
let markets recover, but not be so long that the will to regulate has
completely disappeared by the time the studies appear.
Automatic triggers. Dodd-Frank requires regulators to make capital
requirements for certain regulated institutions countercyclical.202 The
about existing rules.
196. McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 52, at 1671–73.
197. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 39, at 754.
198. Broc Romanek, What the Dodd-Frank Act Means for the Regulators?,
THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET (July 13, 2010, 7:38 AM), http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/
Blog/2010/07/see-page-344-hooray-kirkland.html.
199. McDonnell, Don’t Panic!, supra note 12, at 66–67.
200. Id. at 61–62.
201. Id.
202. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 616(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1615 (2010).
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new Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s regulatory framework
also calls for countercyclical capital requirements.203 Obviously, this is
a direct attack on the procyclical regulation problem.204 The question is:
How are regulators supposed to implement this idea? If requirements
vary at the discretion of regulators, one would fear that the sorts of
political and cognitive stresses analyzed in this Article would frustrate
the aim of this requirement.205 So it would seem to be better to tie
countercyclical capital requirements to a rule that is more or less clear
and automatic.206 The obvious, and difficult, question is, of course, what
measure such requirements should be tied to. We need measures that are
not (very) gameable and that accurately reflect what is going on in
financial markets. That is not easy, not by a long shot.207 Spotting
emerging financial bubbles is intrinsically difficult. Indeed, if it were
easy, the bubbles would generally not occur. Are there really automatic
measures that can serve as a good proxy?208
CONCLUSION
Despite their many differences, all of the models and arguments
considered here are rooted in a public choice perspective on financial
regulation, i.e. rational choice ideas drawn from economics and applied
to politics. But that perspective is modified to take account of
behavioralist biases in rationality, particularly the availability bias. The
availability bias helps explain a procyclical tendency in financial
regulation, as both the public and regulators ignore the threat of
financial crises during boom times and become very focused on that
threat when crises actually occur. The normal dominance of
concentrated interest groups temporarily shifts as public attention turns
to financial regulation following a crisis.
The models differ in how they understand the balance of interest
groups outside of crises and how likely that balance is to lead to
outcomes that reflect the public interest; in how well they think the
crisis-related public attention can be channeled to reflect the public
interest; and in how they analyze the underlying vulnerability of
financial institutions and markets and the intellectual difficulty of
203. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A
GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS ¶ 149
(rev. 2011).
204. See Gabilondo, supra note 12, at 486–89.
205. See Kowalik, supra note 29, at 72–73.
206. Id. at 74.
207. See id.; Mathias Drehmann, Claudio Borio & Kostas Tsatsaronis, Anchoring
Countercyclical Capital Buffers: The Role of Credit Aggregates, 7 INT’L J. CENT. BANKING 189,
191 (2011).
208. I explore proposed rules implementing the countercyclical trigger in Brett H.
McDonnell, Designing Countercyclical Capital Buffers, N.C. BANKING INST. (forthcoming).
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regulation.209 This leads to differing critiques of either underregulation
in booms or overregulation in crises.
It is hard to choose among these competing models by looking at the
historical evidence—the evidence is complex and subject to varied
interpretations, our empirical tools are relatively weak, and our
intellectual and ideological preconceptions are strong and tend to drive
the debate. This Article has argued that Model 1, as a whole, best fits
U.S. history. This is not great news—after all, it means we are both
deregulating too much during booms and regulating too much during
crises, relative to the first-best world. But there is a silver lining—at
least as compared with Models 2 and 3. It suggests that perhaps over
time we are figuring out roughly the right degree and kind of regulation
(if one believes the small S version of Model 1), even though the timing
of changes in regulation is not right.
If we have trouble finding the right diagnosis, then we will naturally
struggle to get the right prescription. That helps explain a certain degree
of hesitance in Part IV’s discussion of administrative responses that
may help dampen financial regulatory cycles. Still, some responses do
look promising. Agency independence is an old but important response,
and in the face of a tendency in the recent crisis to move away from
such independence,210 it could use some renewed emphasis. Regulatory
contrarians, mandated studies, and automatic triggers are other
mechanisms with some promise. Dodd-Frank does experiment with
these mechanisms, so over time we may see whether they are effective.
Procyclical regulation is too deeply rooted in basic facts of political and
economic life to eliminate completely, but with some determination we
may be able to dampen the regulatory cycle.

209. See supra Table 1for a summary.
210. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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Figure 1
Optimal levels of regulation
Dashed lines give the optimal levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a crisis
The vertical line indicates the start of a financial crisis
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Figure 2
Regulation under Model 1
Dashed lines give the optimal levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a crisis
Solid lines give the actual levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a crisis
The vertical line indicates the start of a financial crisis
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Figure 3
Regulation under Model 2
Dashed lines give the optimal levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a crisis
Solid lines give the actual levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a crisis; the three solid lines pre-crisis indicate alternate
possibilities
The vertical line indicates the start of a financial crisis
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Figure 4
Regulation under Model 3
Dashed lines give the optimal levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a crisis
Solid lines give the actual levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a crisis; the three solid lines post-crisis indicate alternate
possibilities
The vertical line indicates the start of a financial crisis
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Figure 5
Model 1 with increasing level of regulation
Dashed curves give the optimal levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a pair of crises
Solid curves give the actual levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a pair of crises
The vertical lines indicate the starts of financial crises

1646

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

Crisis

[Vol. 65

Crisis

Figure 6
Model 1 with increasing level of regulation
Dashed curves give the optimal levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a pair of crises
Solid curves give the actual levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a pair of crises
The vertical lines indicate the starts of financial crises
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Figure 7
Model 2

Dashed curves give the optimal levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a pair of crises
Solid curves give the actual levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a pair of crises
The vertical lines indicate the starts of financial crises
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Figure 8
Model 2 with increasing average regulation
Dashed curves give the optimal levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a pair of crises
Solid curves give the actual levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a pair of crises
The vertical lines indicate the starts of financial crises
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Figure 9
Model 2 with increasing regulation
Dashed curves give the optimal levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a pair of crises
Solid curves give the actual levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a pair of crises
The vertical lines indicate the starts of financial crises
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Figure 10
Model 3 with decreasing actual regulation
Dashed curves give the optimal levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a pair of crises
Solid curves give the actual levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a pair of crises
The vertical lines indicate the starts of financial crises
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Figure 11
Model 1 with endogenous crisis timing
Dashed curves give the optimal levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a crisis
Solid curves give the actual levels of regulation at different periods
relative to a pair of crises
The vertical lines indicate starts of financial crises—the two dotted lines
for crises given actual regulation; the dashed line for a crisis given
optimal regulation

